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Clifton: Clifton: Recent Developments: The Uniform Arbitration Act

THE RIGHT TO SUE VS. THE
AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE:
THE DILEMMA IN TITLE VII
CASES
Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.1

I. INTRODUCTION
In enacting Title VII, Congress specifically gave employees who are victims
of discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin the
opportunity for judicial redress through the federal courts.2 In Alexander v.
Gardner-DenverCo., 3 the Supreme Court held that a Title VII suit could be
maintained despite a clause in an employment contract providing for the arbitration
of all employment disputes. After Alexander, two federal circuit courts followed
the Supreme Court's ruling.4 However, a recent trio of Supreme Court decisions
favoring contractual agreements for the arbitration of several statutorily-founded
claims5 cast doubt upon the continued applicability of Alexander to employment
discrimination suits. It is in this context that the question arises once again.
II. THE FAcTS
Joan Chanson Alford was a stockbroker with Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.
(Dean Witter) until she was fired by the brokerage firm.6 Alleging that her
dismissal was the result of discrimination, Alford brought a Title VII suit for sex
discrimination and sexual harassment against Dean Witter in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Texas.7 Dean Witter filed a motion to
dismiss the suit with prejudice and to compel arbitration, contending that Alford

1. 905 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1990).
2. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36,56 (1974); Benestad v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp., 752 F. Supp. 1054, 1057 (S.D. Fla. 1990); 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(aXl), 2000e-5(f), (g) (1988).
3. 415 U.S. 36.
4. Swenson v. Management Recruiters Int'l, Inc., 858 F.2d 1304, 1305-09 (8th Cir. 1988), reh'g
denied, 872 F.2d 264 (8th Cir. 1989); Utley v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 883 F.2d 184, 185-87 (1st Cir.
1989).
5. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 640 (1985);
Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 238 (1987); Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 483-85 (1989).
6. Alford, 905 F.2d at 104-05.
7. Id.
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needed to submit her claim to commercial arbitration as required by a clause in
her employment contract! The district court denied Dean Witter's motion, and

Dean Witter appealed
Concluding that the 1974 Supreme Court decision of Alexander v. GardnerDenver Co. governed this case, the United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit,

affirmed the district court's decision."

The court of appeals held that an

employee may pursue a Title VII lawsuit for sex discrimination and sexual
harassment rather than submit her claim to commercial arbitration as called for in
her employment contract."
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
As the Alford court recognized, the instant decision forced the court to
reconcile two equally important, but conflicting, national concerns: the strong
policy favoring commercial arbitration over litigation, and weighty federal
legislation designed to fight discrimination." In recent decisions, the United
States Supreme Court tended to favor contractual arbitration provisions over
litigation, declaring that "any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues
should be resolved in favor of arbitration." 13 This preference for arbitration
applied even to claims based on federal statutory grounds.14 In fact, "permitting
enforcement of statutory remedies by means of contractual arbitration has ...
become the norm ... ."" For example, in three recent cases the Supreme Court
held predispute agreements to arbitrate enforceable for the arbitration of antitrust
claims brought under the Sherman Act,' 6 claims brought under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act,' and even claims brought under the Securities Act of 1933.'a
A.

Title VII Suits

While the recent trend enforces arbitration provisions, the Supreme Court's
Alexander decision protects Title VII suits from the reach of such a trend. 9 In
Alexander, the Supreme Court held that an employee's statutory right to a trial de

8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 105.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. (quoting Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 406 U.S. 1, 24-25
(1982)).
14. See id. at 106.
15. Id.
16. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 636-37.
17. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 238, 242.
18. Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 485.
19. Alexander, 415 U.S. 36.
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novo under Title VII could not be foreclosed by the prior submission of his claim
to arbitration pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement." The Alexander
court felt that "the federal policy favoring arbitration of labor disputes and the
federal policy against discriminatory employment practices can best be accommodated by permitting an employee to pursue fully both his remedy under the
grievance-arbitration clause of a collective bargaining agreement and his cause of
21
Alexander makes it clear that "[t]here is no suggestion
action under Title VII"
in the statutory scheme [of Title VII] that a prior arbitral decision either forecloses
an individual's right to sue or divests federal courts of jurisdiction." 22 This is
because "[t] he purpose and procedures of Title VII indicate that Congress intended
federal courts to exercise final responsibility for enforcement of Title VII; deferral
to arbitral decisions would be inconsistent with that goal."' In a final footnote
the Court instructs that "[other] courts should be ever mindful that Congress, in
enacting Title VII, thought it necessary to provide a judicial forum for the ultimate
claims. It is the duty of courts to assure
resolution of discriminatory employment
24
the full availability of this forum."
Two circuit courts extended Alexander's rationale to arbitration of Title VII
claims under commercial arbitration agreements. 5 In Swenson v. Management
RecruitersInternational,Inc.,' the Eighth Circuit noted that:
[A]lthough Alexander involves a collective bargaining agreement, and
not a commercial arbitration agreement under the [Federal Arbitration
Act], this fact should not change the court's analysis. The Alexander
Court was well aware that federal policy favors arbitration. That
decision turned not on the fact that a collective bargaining arbitration
was involved, but instead on the unique nature of Title VII. 27
In Utley v. Goldman Sachs & Co.,28 the United States Court of Appeals,
First Circuit, found the Swenson court's analysis "compelling," quoting from
Swenson:

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. at 60.
Id. at 59-60 (emphasis added).
Id. at 47.
Id. at 56.
Id. at 60 n.21.
Swenson, 858 F.2d at 1305-09; Utley, 883 F.2d at 185-87.
858 F.2d 1304.
Id at 1306.
883 F.2d 184.
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[I]n the passage of Title VII it was the congressional intent that
arbitration is unable to pay sufficient attention to the transcendent public
interest in the enforcement of Title VII. Title VII mandates the
promotion of public interest by assisting victims of discrimination. The
arbitration process may hinder efforts to carry out this mandate. 29
Although at least one district court has held that Title VII claims must be
arbitrated where provided for in employment contracts," no circuit court has so
held,3" and the Supreme Court has done nothing to disturb its ruling in Alexan32
der.
B. ADEA Suits
While the circuit courts unite in their approach to the enforceability of
predispute contractual agreements to arbitrate Title VII suits, they differ as to
whether litigation should prevail over arbitration agreements found in claims based
on another anti-employment discrimination statute, the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) 3 Congress enacted the ADEA to "promote
employment of older persons based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit
arbitraryage discrimination in employment.., to help employers and workers
find ways of meeting problems arising from the impact of age on employment."4
Often, the ADEA is considered to be comparable to Title VII,3' yet, two circuit
courts reached opposite results in recent cases addressing the arbitrability of
36
ADEA claims.
In Nicholson v. CPC InternationalInc.,37 a majority of the United States
Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, held that an employer could not compel
arbitration as called for in an employment contract of a former employee's claim
that his termination violated the ADEA. 3 8 The majority found the Mitsubishi

29. Id. at 187 (quoting Swenson, 858 F.2d at 1307).
30. Roe v. Kidder Peabody & Co., No. 88 Civ. 8507, slip op. at 7 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 1990)
(WESTLAW, DCT database). The Roe court concluded that the three recent Supreme Court cases
enforcing contractual agreements to arbitrate statutory claims (Mitsubishi,McMahon, and Rodriguez
de Quijas) and the Supreme Court's remand of a decision declining to enforce a predispute agreement
to arbitrate an ERISA claim, Bird v. Shearson/Lehman-American Express, Inc., 110 S. Ct. 225 (1989),
entitled Kidder to arbitration of Roe's Title VII discrimination claim. Roe, No. 88 Civ. 8507, slip op.
at 7.
31. Alford, 905 F.2d at 106.
32. See Utley, 883 F.2d at 186; Alford, 905 F.2d at 105.
33. 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 621 -34 (1985 & Supp. 1990).
34. Id. § 621 (b) (emphasis added).
35. See Nicholson v. CPC Int'l Inc., 877 F.2d 221, 227 (3d Cir. 1989); Alford, 905 F.2d at 106
n.3.
36. Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 231; Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 895 F.2d 195, 203 (4th

Cir. 1990).
37. 877 F.2d 221.
38. Id. at 230.
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Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,39 Shearson/American Express,
Inc. v. McMahon,' and Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express41
holdings limited to claims involving business transactions.42 In support of this
conclusion, the majority stated that "[n]othing in Mitsubishi or Shearson suggests
that the Court was overruling its prior holdings that arbitration agreements do not
preclude access to a judicial forum for resolution of claims arising under the Fair
Labor Standards Act" under 42 section 1983 and under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.45 After examining the text, legislative history, and objectives
of the ADEA, the circuit court concluded that the right to a judicial forum under
the ADEA, like that under Title VII, could not be displaced by a pre-conflict
agreement in employment contracts to arbitrate disputes. 44
The United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, found the reasoning of
the majority in Nicholson "unpersuasive"45 and so chose not to follow it in
Gilmer v. InterstatelJohnsonLane Corp.' In Gilmer, the Fourth Circuit enforced
an arbitration agreement in an employment contract when the employee's claim
against the employer was brought under the ADEA. 47 The Gilmer majority
found the Supreme Court's approval of arbitration agreements in Mitsubishi,
McMahon, and Rodriguez de Quijas controlling," and stated that the ADEA "is
devoid of any congressional statement of intent to preclude waiver of the judicial
forum."49 Furthermore, the majority found the Alexander Title VII decision to
be inapposite because it did not mention the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) s ° and
because it involved arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement.51 The
majority seemed to imply that Alexander would no longer apply where compelled
arbitration is pursuant
to an individual's employment contract, even in the context
52
of a Title VII suit.

39.
40.
41.
42.

473 U.S. 614.
482 U.S. 220.
490 U.S. 477.
Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 224.

43. Id.
44. Id. at 230.

45. Gilmer, 895 F.2d at 202.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id.
ld. at 203.
Id. at 200.
Id. at 203.

50. Id. at 201; 9 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-16 (1970 & Supp. 1991). Note that this argument is dismissed
by the Alford court. Alford, 905 F.2d at 107.
51. Gilmer, 895 F.2d at 202. Note that this argument is also rejected by the Alford court. Alford,
905 F.2d at 107.
52. Gilmer, 895 F.2d at 202.
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IV. THE INSTANT DECISION

A. The Alford Decision
In Alford, Dean Witter argued that Alexander did not control this case for
three reasons, none of which the court of appeals found convincing 3 First,
Dean Witter asserted that since Alexander specifically held that an employee could
pursue both arbitration and Title VII remedies at the same time, the Supreme
Court implied that Alford was required to arbitrate first and sue under Title VII
later.' The court of appeals dismissed this argument, stating that to conclude
that an employee had the opportunity to pursue her claim in both forums was not
the same as concluding that the employee was required to "exhaust" all contractual
arbitration remedies before she could file a Title VII suit. 5 In fact, the court
noted that if the employee only asserted claims founded on discrimination
prohibited by Title VII, she may find no reason to pursue arbitration. 6
Dean Witter's second argument explained that Alexander did not apply here
since it was based on labor arbitration, while the instant case addressed arbitration
under the Federal Arbitration Act. 7 The court of appeals agreed that the
Alexander court emphasized arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement,
but noted that this was the only kind of arbitration prevalent in employment
relations at the time of the Alexander decision. 58 Just because the Supreme Court
did not consider the FAA in Alexander did not mean that Alexander did not
apply.59 Rather, the court of appeals found that Alexander rested primarily on
a construction of Title VII and that while there are significant differences between
labor arbitration and commercial arbitration, there is a strong federal policy
favoring both types of arbitration. 60 Since the Supreme Court was willing to
subordinate labor arbitration to Title VII, the court of appeals refused to
automatically infer that commercial arbitration would not be subordinated.6 1
Dean Witter's final contention was that Alexander has been undercut by
recent Supreme Court decisions favoring commercial arbitration.62 The appellate
court's response was simply that it had no authority to overrule an apparently
controlling Supreme Court decision: "We are bound by the broad wording of
Alexander."63

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Alford, 905 F.2d at 106-07.
Id.
Id. at 107.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 108.
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B. Alford Overruled
On May 20, 1991, the Supreme Court granted a petition for certiorari in
connection with the Alford decision." The Supreme Court vacated the judgment
and remanded the case to the Fifth Circuit to reconsider in light of the Supreme
Court's decision in Gilmer v. InterstatelJohnsonLane Corp.' In Gilmer, decided
May 13, 1991, the Court affirmed a Fourth Circuit decision enforcing an
employment contract arbitration agreement when the employee's claim was
brought under the ADEA."
On remand, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court and held that Title VII
claims can be subjected to compulsory arbitration.67 The court of appeals stated
that Gilmer required it to reach such a decision. 68 Noting that both the ADEA
and Title VII are civil rights statutes enforced by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, the court had "little trouble" deciding that with Title VII
claims, arbitration agreements prevailed over the Title VII right to a lawsuit in the
federal courts."
In reaching its decision, the court of appeals stated that any broad public
policy arguments against requiring compulsory arbitration of Title VII claims were
necessarily rejected by Gilmer.70 Furthermore, the court of appeals found that
its reliance on Alexander in its prior decision was erroneous in light of Gilmer.7,
The court of appeals accepted Dean Witter's arguments that Alexander was not
controlling because, as Gilmer stated,Alexanderaddressed labor arbitration rather
than arbitration under the FAA, and because the Supreme Court since deciding
the use of commercial arbitration with other statutorily
Alexander had approved
72
founded claims.

V. COMMENT
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, provides "it shall be... unlawful
...for an employer... to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin .

. .

."73

As the

Alexander court and later lower courts have found, Title VII was designed to

64. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Alford, 111 S. Ct. 2050 (1991).
65. Id.; Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 111 S. Ct. 1647 (1991).
66. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 11I S. Ct. at 1650.

67. Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 939 F.2d 229, 230 (5th Cir. 1991).
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at 230.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

73. 42 U.S.C § 2000 e- 2 (aX1).
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allow victims of sex discrimination and sexual harassment an opportunity for
judicial redress, specifically through the federal courts. 74
Since the Alexander decision, arbitration advocates argue that arbitration is
superior to litigation as a remedy for employment discrimination. 5 Proponents
of arbitration contend (1) that arbitration is less formal and less costly than a
judicial proceeding, (2) that arbitration is less complex and therefore leads to a
more speedy resolution, (3) that arbitration of discrimination cases would help
reduce the backlog of Title VII suits, and (4) that arbitration would reduce the
disruption and adverse publicity resulting from a Title VII suit.76 They urge that
arbitrators have a greater amount of practical knowledge concerning labor disputes
and can be more flexible than judges to better serve the interests of both parties
to the dispute."
Despite the glowing praise recited by arbitration supporters, arbitration is
clearly not appropriate as the sole remedy for a Title VII discrimination suit. The
arbitration proceeding itself is inadequate, for it was not designed to handle
"multiple claims from a large number of similarly-situated claimants [the kind
appropriate for class action treatment in courts]."" 8 The arbitration process with
its informality lacks the procedural protections of litigation, such as the opportunity for discovery and detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Furthermore, private arbitration occurs outside the view of those governmental entities
(the courts and administrative agencies) charged with enforcing "public" Title VII
rights. 8° In such arbitration, "the private litigant not only redresses his own
injury but also vindicates the important congressional policy against discriminatory
employment practices." 8 ' Arbitrators, especially if they are lay persons, may lack
the legal background necessary to adequately address the issues; and even if they
are lawyers, they still may be unaware of Title VII's complexities.8
Unlike the other statutory schemes where arbitration agreements are
enforced,83 Title VII is a civil rights statute and therefore not commercial in
nature. As the circuit court in the Nicholson ADEA case noted, "different
considerations apply where the employee's claim is based on rights arising out of

74. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 56; Benestad, 752 F. Supp. at 1057; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f),(g).
75. See, e.g., Nelson, Sexual Harassment Title VIi, and Labor Arbitration, ARB. J., Dec. 1985,
at 56 (1985).
76. Clark & Bush, Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Claims: A Need for Statutory
Reform?, 11 T. MARSHA.L LJ. 47, 48 (1985); Oka, Disarray in the Circuit Courts After Alexander
v. Gardner-Denver Co., 9 U. HAW. L. REV. 605, 607-08 (1987).
77. Clark & Bush, supra note 76, at 48; Oka, supra note 76, at 607.
78. Clark & Bush, supra note 76, at 48.
79. Id.; Oka, supra note 76, at 609.
80. Clark & Bush, supra note 76, at 49.
81. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 45.
82. Clark & Bush, supra note 76, at 49; Oka, supra note 76, at 609.
83. See, e.g., Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. 614; McMahon, 482 U.S. 220; Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S.
477.
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a statute designed to provide minimum substantive guarantees to individual
workers."84
The biggest strike against the arbitration of Title VII discrimination cases lies
in the inherently unequal bargaining positions of the parties. Arbitration is
5
inappropriate for parties with grossly disparate powers.s Added to the already
unequal employer-employee relationship (where the employee who had to sign a
contract with a boilerplate arbitration provision to get the job, now faces the loss
or potential loss of her job)," is the further degradation of discrimination present
in a Title VII action. Upon leaving an offensive, if not outright hostile, work
environment, advocates of arbitration would require the employee to submit to
employer-ordered arbitration without the protection provided by Title VII-the right
to a lawsuit.
The Supreme Court in Gilmer rejected these arguments against compulsory
arbitration in the context of an ADEA claim. 7 On remand, the court of appeals
in Alford hurriedly concluded that the rationale behind Gilmer applied equally to
Title VII claims and therefore Title VII claims could be subjected to compulsory
arbitration.ss But does Gilmer so conclusively answer the question presented in
Alford?
The Supreme Court's decision in Gilmer premised its finding on Congress'
intent to preclude a waiver of the right to a judicial forum for ADEA claims.8
Yet in Alexander, the Supreme Court found "there can be no prospective waiver
of an employee's rights under Title VII ...since waiver of these rights would
defeat the paramount congressional purpose behind Title VII." 90 Addressing Title
VII specifically, the Court in Alexander concluded that "Congress, in enacting
Title VII, thought it necessary to provide a judicial forum for the ultimate
resolution of discriminatory employment claims. It is the duty of the courts to
assure the full availability of this forum."91
While the Supreme Court failed to find a congressional intent to preclude
waiver of the right to a judicial forum under the ADEA, it did find such an intent
in the context of Title VII claims.92 On remand, the court of appeals in Alford
failed to consider the differing congressional intent behind Title VII.

84. Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 225 (quoting Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 450 U.S. 728,
737 (1981) (holding the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act prevented the predispute waiver,
pursuant to employment contract arbitration agreements, of the right to judicial redress)).
85. See Id. at 229.

86. "Although this may not constitute the type of duress which renders a contract voidable, we
cannot close our eyes to the realities of the workplace." Id. at 229.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 111 S. Ci. at 1653-55.
Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 939 F.2d at 230.
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 111 S.Ct. at 1653-54.
Alexander, 415 U.S. at 51.

91. Id. at 60 n.21.
92. Id. at 48-49.
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VI. CONCLUSION
While the Supreme Court refuses to affirmatively change its ruling in
Alexander, confusion has crept into this area of the law with the recent Supreme
Court cases of Mitsubishi, McMahon, Rodriguez de Quijas, and now Gilmer
favoring arbitration over litigation. The court of appeals in Afford seemed to think
that Gilmer resolved the issue in the context of Title VII claims. While Gilmer
may have ended the confusion surrounding ADEA claims, it has added even
greater confusion to Title VII claims. TheAlford court stated in its prior decision
"[w]e are bound by the broad wording of Alexander."93 Until the Supreme Court
affirmatively overrules Alexander, the court of appeals is still bound.
JENNIFER A. CuFrON

93. Alford, 905 F.2d at 108.
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